Social Distance a Century Ago

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S1: The following recording may contain explicit language I can’t get more explicit than May with literal say it may.

S2: It’s Tuesday, April 21st, 2020 from Slatted. Just. I’m Mike PESCA. I don’t know if you have noticed this trend. Pick up on it. Little trend. Donald Trump tends to politicize matters up to and including the Corona virus. He does. He does. He says he doesn’t, but he does yesterday.

S3: But this whole thing getting our country back. And, you know, Nancy Pelosi has been. She’s very nasty.

S4: And why why does he have to do this? The question is asked. I’ll tell you why. Because if he didn’t politicize things, he wouldn’t have won. What’s he going to win with his intelligence, his sympathy, the cares about people like me rubric has great programs, his ability to wrangle the legislature. Trump politicizes for the same reason that Lincoln communicated in English, or that Millard Fillmore used his legs for walking, or that Benjamin Harrison wiped his bottom after evacuating. Trump laid out a policy distancing and sheltering, and states followed that policy. He didn’t do a perfect perfectly into it soon. He said all these stupid, incorrect, harmful things beforehand. But if you look at the actual policy, they’re flanked by Bourke’s and Foushee and imperfect implementation of this policy and articulation of this policy. But the policy is the policy of let us shut things down, let us distance and let us see how we do. And so far, we are actually doing tragic in some ways, but perhaps better than expected in others. But here’s the thing that I want to highlight about Trump politicizing things, because right now, as Trump has, I’m not going to say championed, but at least, you know, authored, been in support of the policy of sheltering in place and letting the pandemic run its course and trying a little bit to get aid to the states that need it. He’s mostly done that. And is that has happened. There have been a whole lot of people who are out in force opposing this policy. The policy of the Trump administration and these people who are who are maybe even dangerously opposing Trump and his stated policies are doing so while waving Donald Trump flags. Donald Trump 20, 20 flags. And that really is a kind of genius. Yes. It’s it’s the genius of convincing stupid people. But you know what? I do not have that ability. I am cursed with only being able to convince smart people. Hello, audience. Don’t believe me. Well, that’s on you then. Here is a guy in Donald Trump who could have a lot of vocal opposition on his hands. But all he has to do is type into a computer or possibly a phone. The word liberate, maybe in caps before the name of a state and then another state. And then a third state gets all that. And then another state and then a third state. And he is the guy. Sorry. And he gets credit for it. He is the guy that is overseeing a policy that they hate. And yet he is the guy overseeing a policy that they hate. And yet they give him more love and more fealty than they do any other politician. They the people who hate his policy the most. So why does he play politics to some extent? He’s good at it.

S5: Really, Tony, one extent. Which is serving his base. Over and over and over. But he does serve them. He serves them with words. He serves them with tweets. And sometimes he’s so good at that that he gets out of serving them with actual actions. I mean, in a way, he is serving them by saving their lives and our lives. But he doesn’t actually give in to their policy demands. It’s a little like tariffs where he was hurting farmers, he was hurting manufacturers or people who work for manufacturers, but who love that policy the most.

S4: It was those very people. His biggest supporters were the people who should be opposing him the most. So now a little like tariffs. Here’s what you hope.

S5: You hope that it’s not just hurting his supporters, 5 percent or 10 percent or 25 percent of their incomes, but doesn’t start hurting them in their actual lungs and start hurting them in their actual lives. And you hope that hurt doesn’t seep on to hurting medical responders and hurting innocent people. They come into contact with. That is the hope. That is my hope. I don’t think that is Trump’s hope, because that hope or caring about people that does not play a part in what I have called his genius on the show today. An animal experiment. OK. That is just an accurate. We will not be harming animals. How about this? It’s a what if what if all of this all of this pandemic were playing out in an America where the pandemic wasn’t wished away. But a lot of the anger was what if? But first, in 1918, a soldier in Kansas fell ill. Two years later, six hundred seventy five thousand Americans were dead of what is called what’s called the Spanish flu for almost a hundred years. The measures different communities adopted to combat the flu were poorly understood. Basically the question, what worked? Underexplored.

S6: But then historians from the University of Michigan against scouring medical and media reports to get a sense of the Great Plague. J. Alex Navarro ran that project and he joins me next.

S7: Let me now read to you from The Charles Evening Post. Charleston, South Carolina, September 30th, 1918 Circus Tours Limited. The following statement was issued at the governor’s office today. What Governor Manning was unable to accomplish under the law in his endeavor to close South Carolina. Two circus exhibitions. At this time, because of the danger of infectious diseases and the demoralization and loss of labor, he had succeeded in part by negotiating and as a result. Although three circuses will exhibit in the state, they will not show at many places at which they were scheduled to appear. Ringling Brothers will exhibit at only three places in the state. This is just one small tidbit under the rubric of circuses contained within just such a fantastic resource called the Influenza Encyclopedia. It is an archive of the coverage of the influenza outbreak of 1918 and 1920. And not only is it interesting and informative, it is in fact vital to understanding how a past epidemic played out and whether social distancing which they use then worked. J. Alex Navarro is the co-editor of The Influenza Encyclopedia. Lead researcher, the lead researcher on this project. He maintains the influenza archive. Hello. Thanks for joining us, Professor Navarro. You’re welcome. Glad to be here. So before I get into what you found and how you present it, why why was this project undertaken?

S8: So that’s kind of a long story. It goes back to 2005. In fact, the Center for the History of Medicine at the University of Michigan was contacted by a think tank inside the Defense Department. None of us at the center, they heard of them as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. And there had been this this urban legend, if you will, of these maybe a community or two that escaped influenza. Gunnison, Colorado, is the one that everyone has kind of focused on that escaped influenza in 1918. And the Defense Department wants to know why did they do? Could we apply those lessons to a potential pandemic influenza outbreak today? This was 2005. The fear of H5N1 avian flu is sort of looming. Yeah, and they want to know, could the military load up, you know, ships with soldiers and sailors? Another. Military personnel and ship them off to sea before the outbreak actually spread to the United States with that. Well, that’s our save them. And so we looked at these escape communities. And when we did find some escape communities, Yarber one island, which is an island off the coast of San Francisco. It was a naval station at the time. They closed the entire county of Gunnison, Colorado, closed itself. And there were a couple other places that were basically sub communities, Princeton University, Braemar University. So they they were able to somewhat isolate themselves from the broader community. They, in fact, escaped getting the worst cases of influenza in the fall of 1918 when they reopened. Of course, they still had a population that was susceptible. So they did get cases. But, you know, as we saw with, you know, the diamond princess and now on some of the naval ships, you know, it only takes one infected person when everyone’s in close quarters like that on a ship to have a major outbreak. So it’s not really the best idea. Following on that work, a doctor by the name of Marty Cetron, he’s the head of the Division of Global Migration and Quarantine at the CDC. He came to us and he said, look, we want to look at what cities did you know looking at these small communities of a couple thousand people doesn’t really tell us a whole lot. We want to look at what community larger cities did in 1918 to see if there’s some lessons there. You know, we knew that a lot of cities implemented these what we call non-pharmaceutical interventions, a social distancing orders. But there really hasn’t been a quantitative study to look at whether or not they were effective right now.

S3: Let me interrupt and say your background is what of a historian, historian, searcher?

S8: Yes, I am. Yep. I’m a page a historian.

S9: So you’re thinking, OK. You know, history is about learning and it’s certainly applicable. And you have these santayana quote somewhere plastered through your memory, if not your office. But had you actually work that tangibly with researchers seeking to find a distinct answer to a question before.

S8: No. I mean, this was this was really interesting. You know, for us, historians are used to working, you know, on occasion will collaborate with another historian. But, you know, most of us bury our noses in dusty old books and archival material. We work alone on the past and, you know, never do. Historians really think that the work we’re going to do is going to have any kind of impact on any policy, let alone, you know, major public health policy. So now this is really pretty interesting, a novel for us.

S9: And you knew it would you didn’t you only have to hope it would because it was literally being commissioned by the policymakers.

S8: Right. So you know what? We hoped we could find that there were, you know, that these social distancing measures actually work. That was the whole point of the study. When we started. We thought that not being a statistician, I thought. And I think my colleagues at the center thought that this was going to be really difficult. We might be able to glean some qualitative messages out of this about, you know, maybe collaboration and cooperation between mayors and city officials, the health commissioner, maybe, you know, mayors and governors that there might be some kind of lesson there. We didn’t really think that we would be able to find anything that was statistically provable. And in fact, we we discovered working with the CDC statisticians and the team of historians that we had, that when you lay all these non-pharmaceutical interventions out and we found the dates when they implemented them, the dates when they took them off, what kind of social distancing measures they implemented. We found that as our paper Repulsion 2007 states that the early Layard and sustained use of these non-pharmaceutical interventions was associated 1918 with both a lower peak as well as overall mortality and morbidity so that they, in fact, work. And you can see this if you look at some of the curves cities that implemented these non-pharmaceutical interventions, social distancing measures early in a layered fashion. So they closed more than just schools, a closed other businesses and had social public gathering bans. And if they kept them in place for longer, that those cities actually fared better. And you can see that in a lot of the epi curves for these cities, the death curves, you can see when they implement these farm non-pharmaceutical interventions, there’s always going to be a delay because they’re basing on cases. But, you know, death is a lagging indicator. You see them after a while, they the curve start to dip down. They start to flatten. Then a lot of cities, depending on the region of the country, they may not have been through their epidemic. And so they thought, well, OK, we’re in the clear. They removed those NPI, those non-pharmaceutical interventions. And then you see shortly thereafter, you see the peak starts to crest again and go back up. So that’s kind of the the concern today as we all go through these stay at home waters is that, you know, when did we remove them because we’re afraid that another peak might come.

S9: But so much of the information you’ve got, I mean, you looked at the official medical records, but the popular press contains so much of the information. Right. About the extent of the measures and the effectiveness.

S8: Yeah, absolutely. I mean, we did a lot of work to try and track down things like municipal health reports, which are really difficult to find from this period. And we tried to get them for the years prior to 1918. So we tried to get them for at least 1960, 1970 through about 1920. But they don’t tell you a whole lot. Some of them are really short. You know, a couple like what is your. It was a very lengthy report from last summer, just a few pages. The real meat of the archive and what we based our work on was this day to day reporting in the newspapers. So what we did is we chose the two largest circulation newspapers in each city at the time and we sent researchers, myself included. We went to whatever archive, had these microfilm reels and we went sat at the microfilm machine and we went real by real day by day through these reels to look at every single article that mentioned influenza. And we were just printed out. And then, you know, back at the center, we just pored through all this data looking for what they did and how it worked.

S9: Now, I’ve always been interested in the period. I saw a documentary on it when I was young and I just couldn’t believe that this had happened and no one talks about it. Then I read the John Barry book, but I recently came to it when reading about that infamous parade in Philadelphia. I think The Washington Post called it the America’s Deadliest Parade. And there is a pretty crude chart that shows something like flattening the curve. Here’s how the pandemic played out in Philadelphia, where they didn’t have social distancing. And here’s how it played out in St. Louis. When you go to the archives and you read more in-depth about it, it’s not that simple. There’s texture to these decisions. And we perhaps shouldn’t vilify some of the public officials who said, go out and let’s applaud this bond parade. Let’s not forget World War 1 was underway yet at the same time. If there is a headline. Philadelphia felt a distance and paid for it. That is true, isn’t it?

S8: Yeah, absolutely. You know, you’re right that it is a little bit easier to from a distance of 100 years to forget that this was a nation at war, that this was a nation that we didn’t have. The understanding then that this was even caused by a virus. People back in 1918, new health, you know, public health officials and physicians knew that influenza existed. There had been episodic epidemics since at least in recorded history, since about 15, 80. And I’m sure before that what weren’t recorded. But they didn’t have this understanding that you could have a novel strain of something that would be deadly because nobody had immunity to it. So they knew that their seasonal influenza. They knew that it could be a little bit deadlier in some years than others, but they didn’t really understand why. And then when you place that against the backdrop of the war effort, where cities are really trying their best out, outdo each other in terms of raising money through these Liberty loans. And this is the time of the fourth Liberty Loan Drive and Philly had the largest parade in the nation. It was over two miles long. Thousands and thousands of people lined the streets to watch this parade. The health commissioners at the time, a lot of them didn’t really think that a whole lot could be done. Somewhere a little bit more forward thinking than others. But a lot of them thought, well, this is just influenza. It broke out in the military camps first. So they thought, well, this is just gonna be a military issue. You know, the military will go through it’s epidemic. And we don’t really have a lot to worry about here and unfortunately found out very quickly after that. No, they did have to worry about it.

S9: Yeah. And just to remind people, 1918 seems far enough away that we know no one who really remembers it. I don’t know how many centenarians we know, but remember, it was ten years until we discovered antibiotics. So that’s where we were. So to totally blame the city fathers of these municipalities that did things the wrong way. We were in the dark ages of understanding how this might work.

S8: Yeah, absolutely. You know, Philadelphia is often posited against St Lewis, right? Those are the two act as foils for another. And that’s for a variety reason. Jobs. Philadelphia had one of the worst allthough out of the cities we studied. It was not the worst. Pittsburgh actually did. Wurzburg was the worst. And then you have a big break. Did that? They did not. Now Pittsburgh’s you know, and this is sort of interesting. We don’t really know why this is in every case, but these epidemics are all slightly different. You know, no city has the same epidemic epidemic as another city. Now, we know Philly that they heavily seeded cases right at a time when their epidemic was about to take off anyway. They sort of gave it that boost of adrenaline, right. On September 20th when they had that Liberty loan created in a really short epidemic. But it was really steep. You know, Pittsburgh’s was a little bit more drawn out. S. Lewis did a lot. That was right there. Health commissioner there. Max Starkloff was a kind of a forceful guy. He got in front of the epidemic as quickly as they could, given that this was not a reportable disease. You know, today we talk a lot about not having the data for Kovac. You know, with testing. You know, in no city that we studied was influenza reportable disease at the start, this epidemic. So various cities and states implement this required reporting mechanism at different points, usually in late September, early October. But nobody even had an idea of how many cases there were. And you’re requiring doctors to clinically diagnose them based on what they’re seeing as opposed to, you know, now we have these PCR tests. You can tell exactly if it’s influenza coded, you know, whatever you’re testing for. They were flying. They were in the dark. There were cities that did better than St. Lois. You know, I should mention, some are outliers. Grand Rapids, Michigan, did really well. It was an outlier. We don’t really know why Grand Rapids did so well. They didn’t really act very quickly. They didn’t keep their non-pharmaceutical interventions in place for for very long. It could be, you know, the. We can’t really measure sort of differences in the culture of the city, if you will. Spatial geography. How many people live on top of each other in crowded tenements versus if you’re a little bit more spread out, population density, all these things?

S9: Yeah. And San Francisco apparently did institute what we would call social distancing and got hit really hard.

S8: They did. So a lot of it has to do with when they acted. And it’s not necessarily the date that they acted. It’s sort of how early in their epidemic. So in our 2007 paper before we are through with this one, too, about. Exactly. Exactly. Yeah. So, you know, you so we call it the public health response time. And we measured that as the time that that delay between when that city’s epidemic curve hit two times the baseline for seasonal influenza, because you’re always gonna expect some influenza pneumonia deaths every year. So through a boring process, I won’t describe. We calculated what that seasonal baseline influenza death rate would have been and we subtracted that from what the epidemic death rate was. And we plotted that out in that date where that curve hit two times, that baseline. We figured, okay, that’s a pretty good guess as to when public health officials would have realized on the ground that their epidemics were about to accelerate. And then we measured the number of days it took before they actually implemented these social distancing measures. Some cities did really well. They had negative numbers. They actually acted before the epidemic hit that acceleration phase. And others had, you know, a dozen or so days before they actually acted.

S9: Did you pick up this is qualitatively in the reporting attention, such as the one we’re seeing now between factions in society saying do less or do more in terms of social distancing? Or it does strike me that the mode of reporting at the time may have had something to do with if you weren’t picking it up, because it does seem like the newspapers were much more in the stenography mode than they are now, maybe because the literally the only way people had of getting information. Apologies for the multi-faceted question. How did you pick up that tension?

S8: We did. Certainly we did. Now we don’t pick it up in every city. And that could be because it’s either that tension didn’t exist or more likely is because of the reporting. But, yeah, you know, there there’s some really interesting stories you pick up. You mentioned San Francisco. You know, San Francisco implemented a mask, a mandatory masking order. So first, it’s this strong recommendation for people to wear masks on our public. And then as they remove these non-pharmaceutical interventions, they think they can replace them with a mandatory mask order. And people hated it. So we did see in the reporting that there seems to be, at least initially, some very high levels of compliance. But there are also people who hated it so much that they actually went out and formed an anti mask league. And they had at least one meeting that we know of where there were over two thousand people gathered without their masks, even in close contact with one another to protest what they thought were these onerous requirements for them to wear a mask out in public. Now, the masks back then were not as effective as today. They probably weren’t even as effective as sort of a bandana or t mass. They were making today our face covering. They were typically made of surgical gauze and even those were very uncomfortable to people. So they didn’t want to wear them and they didn’t have this idea of, OK, we should socially distance and wear a mask as another layer. It was more OK, we can remove the social distancing measures and just everyone wears a mask and it’s fine.

S9: Right. By the way, that might have played into the early recommendations not to wear masks because one of the downsides was the false sense of security that it might give in San Francisco. It seemed that that actually seemed to be a play in 1918, 1919.

S8: Yeah, absolutely. You know, I mean, I think that it’s the way that the CDC and other agencies at the state level have really talked about face coverings, I think is smart. What they’re saying is now, of course, you know, this isn’t really protective for you. It’s protected for other people. You know, that’s really what face masks are about. They’re there to sort of cap capture as many droplets that you’re expelling as possible and not necessarily to filter out the air that you’re you’re breathing in. And we want to do that in compliance with other social distancing measures as well.

S3: Right now, you’re thinking, what about Newark, Newark and so much more tomorrow in part two with Jay, Alex Navarro.

S5: And now the spiel. What if what if we weren’t at each other’s throats all the time? How would Corona virus play out? Plausible case. Donald Trump wouldn’t be president. This goes before Corona virus. But in an election where Americans weren’t at each other’s throats, there’d be no need to cast a ballot for Donald Trump. And if Donald Trump were in president and the person in the office of president were better at things earlier, the U.S. might be in a better situation. But I can’t say that for sure, because states that are getting a lot of credit now for doing it right, they definitely weren’t as ignorant or truculent or combative as Donald Trump, but they were perfect and they made mistakes. New York closed down late. Andrew Cuomo was talking about the panic being worse than the virus. In early March. So Donald Trump got things wrong. If he wasn’t there, maybe someone else would have got things similarly wrong. Maybe someone else would have gotten things right. But that’s not the America I’m positing and positing in America with a pandemic. But we’re just at each other’s throats less. And in fact, I want to stop criticizing Donald Trump quite so much right now to embody the spirit of not being at each other’s throats. What if America just that the tenor, the pitch of American politics and commentary and public life were pretty much at the median pitch of where we were somewhere after the Great Depression and before Newt Gingrich took over the Republican Party? There would be criticism, there would be unhappiness, there’d be some discontent, there’d be good decisions and bad decisions. There’d be people upset with those decisions and people happy with those decisions. But there wouldn’t be this free floating anger. There wouldn’t be a seething that at times blinds us from very real and very dire circumstances. Let me just give you an example of a few things that might be different. It might even be hard to realize. Oh, yeah, that doesn’t have to be the way it is. Let’s look at ventilators. Ventilators have become a cudgel. Ventilators have become an accusation. Yesterday in the press conference. Donald Trump said ventilator is ventilators, ventilators. He was venting a little bit, but he was pointing to them as, oh, my gosh, you blamed me about ventilators. But I was right about ventilators. He was saying, you blame me about ventilators, but I was right about ventilators. Governors were wrong about ventilators. Ventilators as vindication. The vindictive use of ventilators, right wing media is now covering ventilators, as in your face media. Some left wing media is angrily shouting back.

S4: That’s because we use distancing you idiots.

S5: But in the not at our throats world, we might be saying, you know, the initial concern about ventilators. Well, first of all, it’s totally understandable because we thought when you can’t breathe, when your oxygen level is at dangerously low levels. The only thing we can do is incubate only. It turns out that as the virus progressed, we found out that a lot of those assumptions were wrong. I mean, this is a novel corona virus we couldn’t have known. Let’s give ourselves a break. Remember, we’re not at each other’s throats. Let’s give ourselves a break about some of the assumptions being right. We tried to plan for a worst case scenario. Let’s also realize the worst case scenario didn’t happen. Maybe even we didn’t come within 10 percent of the worst case scenario, though, in some New York hospitals, they were splitting ventilators between two patients in an unprecedented and dangerous experiment. But it is true, as the Trump administration says, it does seem that no American has died because of a lack of a ventilator. And that seems to be the sort of in-your-face statement that would get Trump’s critics spitting mad. But it doesn’t have to think about another way to look at that. We thought that this was a tool that we needed. We needed it a little less because of luck, because of good circumstances, because of some good decisions, but also because we reconceptualize what our need was for ventilators just at a not at each other’s throats world. We’d be thinking about that. Probably insane, huh? Wonder if there are applicable lessons to other parts of treating the corona virus hydroxy chlor. OK, now we’re at each other’s throats about that.

S1: Does it work? Doesn’t it work? Are you giving us false hope? Are you a snake oil salesman? Are you taking away the hope from the American people today? A big study emerged that indicated it might be more harmful than hurtful, especially when used in conjunction with erythromycin. But there would be no end zone dances over that. It’s strange. Have you read the coverage of that? Well, Trump was wrong. If we were just not at each other’s throats and there wasn’t a rightness or wrongness that extended beyond the medical efficacy of these drugs, I think it would be a more reasonable, rational place locked down versus economic activity. Not at our throats world, there’d be no versus with the versus would be. You know, the kind of tension inherent in every choice, but not a stake to drive through the heart. It really shouldn’t be a wedge issue. We would all admit that mass deaths are the biggest enemy to a good economy. And we would also admit, well, of course, a good economy leads to better outcomes for all the verses. To the extent that we’d say verses would take on a different meaning. It would be a balance to work to try to achieve rather than when you did the seesaw or teeter totter on the playground with that jerk who quickly got off and left you crashing to the ground, hurting your bottom in the knot at each other’s throats world. The outliers in this debate between lockdown versus economic activity. The outliers would just be treated as a kind of sad people who maybe didn’t have it all there, but in a pathetic way like this guy.

S10: Are you concerned about this virus? I was in the beginning until I had done my research and found out the realities and the the the media’s overreach on it and that it’s not as serious as they made it out to be. And that’s why I’m here, because I feel that they are overreaching, overreacting and crushing our small businesses, crushing our economy. I see you’re wearing a mask, so you’re going to have some level of concern.

S1: When I listen to him and not at each other’s throat, America just laugh. In real America, I maybe hate the guy a little bit. But then again, not at each other’s throat. America. His ignorance couldn’t be weaponized and not at each other’s throats. America. We also wouldn’t have a media infrastructure to tell him he was right, maybe even to give him that opinion in the first place. Or let’s listen to this guy who is at an open Texas rally over the weekend interviewed by the Austin American-Statesman. This guy wouldn’t similarly inspire in me disgust. It would be more like dismissiveness.

S11: I don’t even get sick. Hardly, anyways. I’m not going to catch the virus. I’m not rubbing off on people, coughing on people in public. No, I’m not worried about transmitting a virus that’s just like another flu.

S1: The paucity of logic in Nathan curlies opinion would not ripple beyond the holder of that opinion. Mr Curling. And then there’s this woman.

S12: There is no reason for this shut down at this point. The disease is not that serious that we should quarantine. We don’t quarantine for the flu. We should not quarantine for Cauvin 19. The psychological repercussions of this quarantine are becoming overwhelming. People have anxiety. They have depression. We have grief. We have guilt and we have panic. To consider those things unimportant. Is to only consider one part and the human being. And that is wrong.

S1: That’s Daniele Gamboa. So first, what I do think right now, what I thought when I heard her in the real satyr, angry, aworld is, well, who’s causing that grieving sister? And if you get your way, your guilts gonna be pretty deserved. That’s what I do think. But what if America were just as infected? But the infection wasn’t one of animosity. And a less angry America, I might think something like, hey, you know, you’re right. And we we who believe that we need to take a lot of care in order to stop the spread. Here you feel exactly what you’re saying and identify with you and identify with those very same concerns, the concerns of the Open America side, not the people who believe in it. It’s a hoax or it won’t get me. But Danielle Gambo there she was wearing a mask in that interview. Delicto understandable. The sentiments legitimate. It’s just that the prescription that they offer is unsafe. Now, I do doubt knowing what I know about humans that I could in this less angry America, I could actually move someone like Danielle or Nathaniel off their points. But maybe I at least wouldn’t push them further into a defensive crouch, or maybe the benefit would just be to myself, not compounding the legitimate concern that’s all around us about the virus, not compounding that with a rage towards those who aren’t taking it seriously enough, of course, to get there. We would have to be assured that our leaders were all making the safest decisions, and at the very least, we would have to know that we weren’t led by the most rageful of them all.

S6: And that’s it for today’s show. Margaret Kelly is just associate producer. She’s done some studying about the effects of cooties and found out that they’ve been greatly exaggerated by the fourth grade newspaper. Also in innoculation or cootie shot might actually be years away. Daniel Shrader, just producer, is a Georgia native who just isn’t sure what to do. First, tattoo parlor, bowling alley, beauty salon or bang his head against the wall several times the jest. If Georgia does reopen its tattoo parlors, let’s hope the tattoo artists craft their own gloves in local looms and knit their own bespoke masks, possibly in the shape of Edvard Mousse, The Scream per adepero Dupere.

S5: And thanks for listening.