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Stopping the Justices from voting before they know the answer –
A proposal for reversing the internal operations of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Douglas W. Kmiec
Heller has already been identified as a test of the fidelity to precedent and restraint of the Roberts Court. That following oral argument, it seems possible if not likely that the Justices will disregard or minimize the significance of the militia clause of the Second Amendment and decide that there is a right of self defense that nowhere exists in the present text of the Constitution presents a unique challenge to that reputation. Putting aside whether that is or is not a defensible constitutional outcome, it is institutionally important for the outcome to be arrived at by means other than mere assertion.
When the Justices assemble around the table in the Chief’s outer office to decide D.C. v. Heller, they will follow the usual practice of voting on the outcome first and only then researching to justify and explain the outcome. With due respect to the Court’s tradition, that methodology is backwards. It is also subversive of public confidence in the Court. In a difficult case, like Heller, where the historical materials, linguistic analysis, and constitutional considerations are plentiful and largely being examined conscientiously for the first time, it is all the more important for the Court to follow the scientific method of doing the research and writing first before deliberation and vote. Reversing the process would have the benefit of: avoiding the appearance of elevating politics over law by actually avoiding the temptation to substitute politics for law. By engaging in the difficult work of legal research and analysis of existing text, history, and precedent before any of the members of the Court are asked to reach an ultimate determination, the Court can increase the odds of writing coherently and with greater unity. Those witnessing this morning's oral argument know that task will be difficult. The analytical strands and possibilities from the meaning of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 to Mr. Madison's expectations of draftsmanship to the deficiency (or not) of precedent, to the nature of trigger locks require Herculean effort to assemble into a proper answer. If they were fully candid, I venture the Justices would concede that at this moment they possess at best a tentative conclusion. Why vote before a fulsome examination of the law by reference to a complete exposition of what one member of the Court would offer as the most honest and defensible constitutional judgment. No one would buy a common appliance not knowing if it could be constructed to perform its intended task. Why ask Justices to accept opinions that have yet to be fully formed?
Who would write the opinion if a preliminary vote were not taken first for purposes of assignment? Quite simply, the Justice next in line for a writing assignment who is fully up to date with his or her work. Once and for all, the residual politics of confirmation would be set aside and only Court administration would govern. Yes, this would deprive either the Chief Justice or the senior associate justice, most often, John Paul Stevens, of the right of assignment, but that deprivation would be in pursuit of a higher order good to which I venture both the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens would subscribe: the elevation of the rule of law and the strengthening of the respect for the Court as an institution.
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Dahlia and Akhil Amar just posted great pieces in Slate about D.C. v. Heller, the guns case to be argued on Tuesday at the Supreme Court. As lots of commentators have already said, this case is irresistible because the court will be writing on a practically blank slate: The relevant precedent is from 1939, and it didn't definitively hold that there's no individual right to bear arms in the Second Amendment, though the court certainly waved in that direction. As Dahlia points out, by staying out of the gun control fray, the court has been practicing a form of judicial restraint for the past 69 years. The big question now is whether it will stick to that path by issuing a decision that recognizes an individual right to bear arms but allows for a lot of gun control regulation, as Solicitor General Paul Clement is urging, or whether it will burn down a whole lot of gun laws in the wake of resurrecting the Second Amendment, as the brief that Vice President Cheney signed, and that David flags for us, would have it. (The court could also cling to the old interpretation of the Second Amendment as speaking only to having a gun for the purpose of serving in a state-run militia, but in light of the recent revisionist scholarship on the subject, I doubt it.) In any case, since this moment is a huge test for judicial restraint and modesty, isn't it also a huge test for Chief Justice John Roberts? Modesty was his mantra during his confirmation hearings. I've argued that he didn't deliver on that promise last term. Is Heller likely to be the big fat data point on this question from 2007-2008? I'm especially intrigued by the question since there's ostensibly a way to duck the looming constitutional question altogether, by treating D.C. as its own oddball scenario since it's not a state. Anyone think that's a likely resolution, or want to weigh in on the Clement v. Cheney face-off?